

DATE 3/16/87

FILE

Central Intelligence Agency

FILE

DOC NO EUR M 87-20039OIR 3

P & PD/



Washington, D.C. 20505

DIRECTORATE OF INTELLIGENCE

10 March 1987

Finland: Election Politics and Personalities

25X1

Summary

Finnish Prime Minister Sorsa's center-left coalition government faces parliamentary election on 15-16 March, in which personalities and jockeying for position in next year's presidential elections appear more important than issues. The voting will provide a testing ground for the competition between Prime Minister Sorsa, Chairman of the SDP, and Foreign Minister Vayrynen, Chairman of the Center Party, both of whom would like to be president. Vayrynen will run against President Koivisto in the 1988 presidential election, although he is likely to lose; Sorsa will probably attempt to succeed fellow Social Democrat Koivisto by running for president in the 1994 election.

25X1

Sorsa's Social Democratic Party (SDP) dominates the current coalition and is likely to be the major partner in a post election coalition government; only an extremely strong showing in the Conservative party is likely to shake SDP dominance. Privatization of state enterprises, tax reform, and the future of nuclear power will probably be among the major domestic issues facing the next government, but none of the parties have made them contentious election issues. Regardless of the outcome of the parliamentary elections, Finnish foreign policy will continue the traditional consensus of armed neutrality, balanced relations with the US and

This memorandum was prepared by [redacted]
Office of European Analysis. Questions and comments are welcome
and may be addressed to [redacted] Chief, West European
Division [redacted]

25X1

25X1

EUR-M87-20039

25X1

25X1

25X1

[redacted]

Soviet Union, and closer economic ties to Western Europe and the Nordic countries. The so called Paasikivi-Kekkonen policy of good neighborly relations with the USSR will remain the main pillar of Helsinki's foreign policy; only in the unlikely event of a Conservative-dominated government could Fenno-Soviet relations be strained. [redacted]

25X1

Issues and Personalities

Because there is a general consensus on foreign policy and on most domestic issues and because the president selects the prime minister, Finnish politics tend to be highly personalized.

Most observers regard the parliamentary election as a prelude to the more important presidential contest next year. Koivisto of the Social Democratic Party remains the most popular figure in Finnish politics and will likely win the presidential election in 1988. According to recent polls, about 57 percent of the Finns favor Koivisto, and he will receive substantial support from members of the Center and Conservative Parties, despite the fact that each of these parties will nominate its own presidential candidate. The personal rivalry which highlights the March parliamentary elections has focused on current Prime Minister and Social Democratic Chairman, Kalevi Sorsa, and Finnish Foreign Minister and Center Party Chairman, Paavo Vayrynen. Both Sorsa and Vayrynen would like to be president after Koivisto, and traditionally the prime ministership has been the stepping stone to the presidency. Although Vayrynen is already the announced Center Party candidate for the 1988 presidential election, he nonetheless covets the prime ministership in any coalition the Center Party might join after the March elections. Prime Minister Sorsa has taken the position that no announced candidate for the presidency in 1988 should be prime minister in 1987--a shaft aimed at Vayrynen. In our view, the Sorsa-Vayrynen rivalry will play a major role in the post-election bargaining, and in the shape of the new government. [redacted]

25X1

Changes within the parties have enlivened the interparty competition for the parliamentary elections. Although Green candidates have matched the gains of similar European environmental groups in the pre-election polls, there has been a decline in support for the Finnish left in general; the formal split in the Finnish Communist Party (SKP) into a minority Stalinist faction (SKP-Y) and a majority Eurocommunist faction

25X1

Table 1

Party Support in Finland (percent of respondents)

	<u>Election March 1983</u>	<u>May 1984</u>	<u>May 1985</u>	<u>Jan 1986</u>	<u>Nov 1986*</u>	<u>Seats in Parliament</u> (as of 3/87)
Social Demo- crats (SDP)	26.7	24.9	25.2	25.6	25.9	57
Conservatives (KOK or National Coalition Party)	22.1	20.4	22.7	23.9	23.8	44
Center Party / Liberals (KESK or KEPU)	16.6	17.7	19.9	19.7	18.5	38
Communist/ Popular Demo- cratic Front	14.0	12.6	11.9	11.7	10.4	27
Rural Party (SMP)	9.7	9.6	6.2	5.5	4.9	17
Swedish People's Party (RKP)	4.9	4.8	4.7	5.4	n/a	11
Christian League (SKL)	3.0	2.8	3.4	3.3	n/a	3
Greens	1.5	6.7*	5.4*	4.3*	5.0*	2
Rightest Con- stitutionalists (POP)	0.4	0.5	0.6	0.6	n/a	1

*May include other parties; reporting is unclear.

**November 1986 reporting is incomplete.

Source: Suomen Gallup OY

25X1

[redacted]

(SKP) has splintered the communist vote.* At the same time, a center-right combination is becoming a more realistic possibility. So far, each of the three main parties (Social Democratic, Center, and Conservative) has avoided preelection deals with the other parties to form a government. The Conservative Party (known also as the National Coalition Party) has moderated its position on privatizing nationalized industries, and publicly has supported friendly relations with the USSR--steps designed to make the Conservatives a credible coalition partner for the Social Democrats or the Center Party. (See Chart 1.) [redacted]

25X1

The Economy and the Elections

The sparseness of debate in the campaign reflects the general stability of the Finnish economy. Finland has successfully undergone a transition from an agrarian-based economy before World War II to an increasingly high-tech industrial and service economy. The absence of salient issues also reflects the electorate's preference in recent decades for broad coalition governments that dilute the differences among parties. None of the parties seriously challenges the role of the government in providing social welfare programs, although the SDP tries to draw ideological distinctions between itself and the Conservatives. In fact, both the Conservatives and the SDP increasingly have an urban, middle-class constituency, which tends to blur the distinctions between the philosophy of the two parties when policies are actually implemented. [redacted]

25X1

Short-run indicators have provided little ammunition for any of the main parties to sustain a campaign either against current policies or in favor of major shifts in policy. For example, although GDP grew at only 2 percent in 1986, recent forecasts have displayed optimism that growth may reach 3 to 4 percent in 1987. In addition, the joint government-labor Committee on Incomes Policy recently reported that real household disposable incomes rose by 2.5 percent in 1986 and may increase by 4.5 percent in 1987. These gains are attributable mainly to lower inflation--down from 5.9 percent in 1985 to 3.6 percent in 1986--and to adjustments in income tax rates to offset inflation. [redacted]

25X1

*The current total parliamentary strength of the Communists is 17 seats for the majority Eurocommunists and 10 for the Stalinist minority. The Communists will probably lose 10 to 11 of these 27 seats. [redacted]

25X1

25X1

25X1

Although unemployment has risen--primarily because of the negative impact on trade with the USSR following the 1986 oil price collapse(see Appendix B)--an improved outlook for the labor market is probably minimizing the electorate's focus on joblessness as an election issue. While unemployment rose from 6.3 percent in 1985 to as high as 7.7 percent in February 1986, the overall 1986 rate was about 7 percent. In October, Vayrynen predicted "mass unemployment" if wage earners did not forego pay increases awarded in last spring's settlements. This warning, however--which was probably part of Vayrynen's campaign of attacking his Social Democratic coalition partners for allegedly risking economic growth by not doing enough to maintain trade with the USSR--alienated Vayrynen from the other parties and even from many members of his own party. The preeminence of achieving consensus, in fact, proved to be the main constraint on Vayrynen's aggressive efforts to stake out a unique position.

25X1

25X1

There are several economic issues that could emerge after formation of the next government, but they have not yet significantly influenced the low-risk, personality-dominated campaign. For example, the next government may begin to examine whether to privatize some of Finland's 19 state-owned firms, and may assess the impact of an increasingly internationalized and technological economy on Finland's national identity. Finnish-Soviet trade has emerged briefly in political rhetoric and will almost certainly continue to be of prime concern to Finnish policymakers, especially as the 1989 expiration of the current five-year framework trade agreement approaches. Other economic issues--including the deregulation of financial markets and foreign exchange laws, tightening controls on reexport of US technology to ensure continued access to it, controlling inflation to improve competitiveness, and determining the future of the nuclear energy program--have not been given much attention during the campaign, but they will certainly continue to be central to Finnish policy. The Conservatives have joined the SDP and the Center Party in voicing opposition to a fifth nuclear power plant, although the Conservatives would probably be quick to reverse course if public sentiment shifted more favorably toward expanding nuclear power.

25X1

Possible Post-Election Scenarios

Several post-election coalitions are possible, and while we expect the Social Democrats to continue their predominance, in our view the Center Party could be the pivotal party in forming a

25X1

25X1

[redacted]

new government. If the competition between Vayrynen and Sorsa can be muted, the Center Party will continue to be a viable partner for the SDP. If these differences cannot be resolved, however, Vayrynen may decide that a Center Party alliance with the Conservatives would advance his political ambitions. The Conservatives might find a deal with the Center Party an attractive arrangement, especially if it brought them back into government. The role of smaller parties such as the Swedish People's Party and the Greens will probably increase, while the Rural Party, like the Communists, will probably decline in support. (See matrix.) [redacted]

25X1

In our view, the most likely outcome of the parliamentary elections will be a continuation of the current coalition government (SDP, Center Party, Swedish People's Party, and Rural Party), dominated by the SDP. [redacted]

25X1

While there have been strains between the SDP and its Center Party partners, SDP members prefer a renewed coalition with the Center Party to a coalition with the Conservatives. The main obstacle to renewing the current coalition is personality rather than policy.

[redacted]

25X1

If a figure from a small third party was named Prime Minister, President Koivisto might be able to promote Sorsa as his successor in 1994 by making Sorsa Foreign Minister--a position we believe he wants. This, in turn, might lessen Vayrynen's appeal to the public and to the Center Party and reduce his attractiveness as a presidential candidate in 1988 or 1994. In our view, however, such a tack risks having the Center Party refuse to join a renewed coalition with the SDP and either work with the Conservatives or go into opposition, forcing the SDP to form a minority government. [redacted]

25X1

[redacted]

25X1

25X1

25X1

[redacted]

The second most probable post-election possibility is a coalition between the SDP, Conservatives, and Center Party, a coalition of the three major parties. Foreign Minister Vayrynen has publicly promoted the idea of a government of the big three parties, apparently assuming that such a coalition would enhance the role of the Center Party as the pivotal party between the Social Democrats on the left and the Conservatives on the right. Vayrynen may rethink this strategy after the election, since the Center Party would have the least weight in a grand coalition. If, on the other hand, the SDP made overtures to the Conservatives to join a government, the Center Party might agree to cooperate if only to stay in government and maintain some cabinet posts.

If the current SDP-Center coalition government does not survive the parliamentary elections or post-election personality rivalries, and a deal between the SDP and the Conservatives cannot be worked out, a minority SDP government is possible until after the 1988 presidential election. [redacted]

25X1

We believe the SDP might be willing to struggle with a minority government position for a year, hoping it will be in a stronger position after the presidential election in 1988. A minority SDP government could almost certainly depend upon parliamentary support from the Communist/Popular Democratic Front, (SKDL see Appendix A), the Rural Party (SMP), the Swedish People's Party (RKP) and the Greens. We doubt the Social Democrats would join the Communists in a formal coalition, since the SDP would be unlikely to risk a possible cut-off of Western technology by bringing the weakened SKP into government. [redacted]

25X1

A short-lived minority SDP government would probably not face major challenges from the Conservatives or the Center Party. The traditional rivalry between the two might even leave a minority SDP government in the position of being wooed by both in any new coalition bargaining following the presidential election in 1988. [redacted]

25X1

Finally, because of likely Conservative election gains, a Conservative-dominated government is a possibility. The Conservative Party, out of government since 1966, is in a better position than it has been in years, and polls show its strength is slowly growing. The Social Democrats and Center Party have been courting it, which lends credibility to the idea that the Conservative Party could be a viable coalition partner. A government which included the Conservatives but was not balanced by Social Democratic participation, however, might be too

25X1

25X1

[redacted]

"rightwing" for Finnish taste. We think the other parties would prefer to test the Conservatives in a safer coalition, one the Conservatives would not dominate. [redacted]

25X1

Moscow and the Finnish Election

[redacted]

the Soviets are concerned about the outcome of the 1987 parliamentary elections because of the remote possibility that an entirely nonsocialist government coalition might be formed between the Conservative Party, Center Party, and the small nonsocialist parties. The split within the Finnish Communist party has added to the problems Moscow faces in judging the Finnish political scene. While the Soviets have supported the Stalinist minority Communist faction, SKP-Y, in the past, they gave formal party recognition to the majority Eurocommunists (SKP) last year, indicating that Moscow would have no objections to Eurocommunist participation in a coalition government. The Soviets have publicly stated that they will treat both factions equally. [redacted]

25X1

25X1

The formal split of the Finnish Communist Party has, in the short term, probably reduced the appeal of either faction to the Finnish electorate or the Soviet Union. The Soviets have made efforts to cultivate the Social Democratic Party and the Center Party and they may establish formal party-to-party relations with the Conservative Party after the parliamentary elections, especially if it appears that the Conservatives will enter a coalition government. [redacted]

25X1

Implications...

Finnish foreign policy is unlikely to change regardless of the outcome of the March parliamentary elections. With the presidential election in 1988, the parties and candidates will probably be preoccupied with renewed election campaigning over the next year. [redacted]

25X1

For the US

- The next government is likely to continue Helsinki's current efforts to improve economic ties to the US. Finland has recently tightened its export control legislation in an effort to accommodate Western governments concerned about reexport of controlled technology to the USSR. We believe Finnish cooperation on this matter is likely to continue, because the Finns fear the damage to their competitiveness that would occur if

25X1

25X1

[redacted]

their access to Western advanced technology were curtailed. In addition, Finnish high-tech firms are likely to become increasingly attracted to the US market and will increase their investment here. Expanded economic ties run the remote risk that Helsinki may feel obligated to balance potential criticism from Moscow by looking for ways to criticize the United States, for example, suggesting that the US naval presence in northern waters heightens regional tension. [redacted]

25X1

For the Soviet Union

- Unless there is a Conservative-dominated coalition after the elections--which we think unlikely--there probably will not be major changes in Fenno-Soviet relations. Helsinki's efforts to maintain friendly relations with Moscow will remain the cornerstone of foreign policy. Twenty percent of Finland's trade is with Soviet Union, and the effort to balance that trade will remain the barometer of Fenno-Soviet relations. Although the Soviets will probably continue to promote an increase in the number of joint venture projects with the Finns, any expansion of such bilateral economic ties would likely occur slowly, mainly because of Finnish uncertainty about the long-run benefits to Finland of Soviet economic reforms. The new government will strive to maintain good relations with the countries of Eastern Europe--especially with Yugoslavia-- although Finnish trade with Eastern Europe is slight. [redacted]

25X1

For Relations with Western Europe and Nordic Countries

- Finland will continue membership in the European Free Trade Association and the Nordic Council. About 35 percent of Finnish trade is with the EEC countries, and Helsinki will probably seek to expand that trade, especially in high technology products. Finnish relations with Sweden will continue to have an especially high priority. Swedish Prime Minister Carlsson made his first official visit abroad to Finland, and both countries are concerned about Soviet activities in the Baltic and Barents Seas. [redacted]
- Finland is also likely to continue to keep debate about a Nordic Nuclear Weapons Free Zone (NNWFZ) alive, although it will not take the lead to implement it. Helsinki will continue to oppose SDI and to promote an expansion of the

25X1

25X1

25X1

[REDACTED]

1972 US-Soviet agreement for preventing conflicts at sea. The Finns will also continue to seek Confidence Building Measures in the North Atlantic and the Baltic Sea, where they perceive a growing concern over what many Nordic politicians claim is an escalating naval arms race. We will probably see increased discussions with the Nordics, the US, and Soviets about reducing Warsaw Pact and NATO naval deployments in Northern waters. [REDACTED]

25X1

[REDACTED]

25X1

Appendix A

The Finnish Communists

Although the divisions within the Finnish Communist Party can be traced back to the World War II period, the formal split of the party into a minority Stalinist Communist Party (SKP-Y) and a majority Eurocommunist Party (SKP) occurred in 1986 when the Eurocommunist Party (SKP) expelled the Stalinists from the SKP. Each party will run its own candidates in the election, dividing the Communist vote*. The minority faction has tried to improve its image by electing new leaders, including a Finnish actress, Kristiina Halkola, as the new chairman of DEVA. Real power, however, remains in the hands of Taisto Sinisalo, chairman of the SKP-Y. The majority party, the SKP, has also tried to improve its image with a new party draft program that reduces traditional Marxist rhetoric and concentrates on creating socialism in Finland. The emphasis would be on reducing the influence of the Conservative Party while promoting the nationalization of Finnish banks, insurance companies, large industrial companies, and energy production. [redacted]

25X1

The SKP may be facing an identity problem in the future that will compound the problem of its declining support. For economic reasons, the SKP will even be forced to share office space and facilities with the non-Communist "left-socialists" who, along with the SKP, use the SKDL as an electoral front. This may tend to blur the distinction between the Communists and the "left socialists." In fact, the SKP's efforts to appeal to the Finnish public may increasingly place it in competition with the Social Democratic Party, the largest and most popular party. [redacted]

25X1

25X1

*The SKDL--the Communist/Popular Democratic Front--is the electoral front of the SKP. DEVA--Democratic Alternative--is the electoral front of the minority SKP-Y.

Appendix B

Finnish-Soviet Trade

The clearing account mechanism based on the 1948 Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation and Mutual Assistance is essentially a barter arrangement under which Finnish export earnings from the USSR can only be used to purchase Soviet goods. The trade relationship has become a major component Finland's of postwar effort placate Moscow and safeguard autonomy. Moscow sells mostly oil to Finland, while Finland generally sends finished engineering and forestry products and large-scale construction projects to the USSR. [redacted]

25X1

Moscow and Helsinki negotiate five-year frameworks on trade, and make annual adjustments in the trade protocols that spell out the goods to be traded in order to eliminate imbalances that develop. When one of the partners finds itself building up a trade surplus, it can try to maintain its trade value while limiting its actual clearing account surplus--and technically abide by the overall agreement--through a number of stopgap measures, including shipment delays, lags in recording shipments, overdraft credit limits (usually about 7 percent of total bilateral trade), and transfers of purchases to a hard-currency basis. If imbalances persist, however, the countries will probably need to negotiate export cuts and import increases by the surplus country. [redacted]

25X1

1986 was a particularly trying year for this bilateral trade system because the collapse in oil prices--which cut the value of scheduled Soviet exports to Finland by about one-third--led to a growing bilateral surplus on the Finnish side that reached \$800 million by the end of the year. During the year, Finland had to reduce its exports to the USSR by about 11 percent below planned levels to limit the mounting surplus. By the time negotiations on adjustments to the 1987 trade protocol were underway late in the year, Helsinki had become increasingly worried that Finnish exports would have to be cut by another 20 percent to balance trade. Instead, they were pleased that Moscow agreed in January to maintain trade at 1986 levels, and 1987 bilateral trade may even rise if oil prices stay above \$17 per barrel. [redacted]

25X1

The new agreement--which accompanied reassurances by Soviet Prime Minister Ryzhkov that Finland will remain the cornerstone of Soviet European policy--cuts the Finnish clearing account

25X1

surplus by permitting Finland to boost its oil imports and by converting about half of the surplus into a ruble loan to the Soviets repayable with interest over five years. Helsinki may grow concerned, however, that domestic factors in the USSR will lead to shortfalls in the expected additional energy exports to Finland. The Finns may also grow anxious about the future of this relationship as the 1989 expiration date of the current framework agreement approaches. In particular, they will watch Gorbachev's economic reforms for signs of whether Moscow's new policies, such as permitting some Soviet manufacturers to make their own contacts with Western firms, lead to a deemphasis of the balanced trade stipulation that is the underlying principle of Finnish-Soviet trade relations. [REDACTED]

25X1

Party	Personalities	Policies
Social Democratic Party (SDP)	President Mauno Koivisto Prime Minister Kalvi Sorsa, Chairman SDP	--Supports traditional Finnish neutrality --Desires closer ties to Western Europe and US --Opposes SDI, --Supports Nordic Nuclear-Weapons-Free-Zone Dialogue --skeptical Gorbachev's reforms will benefit Finnish-Soviet trade
Conservative Party (KOK or National Coalition Party)	Ilkka Suominen, Chairman Harri Holkeri, Presidential Candidate	--Supports traditional Finnish neutrality --Supports privatization of state-owned firms --favors nuclear power if public mood is right --would not take the lead on Nordic NWFZ dialogue
Center Party/Liberals* (KESK or KEPU)	Foreign Minister Paavo Vayrynen, Chairman Center Party	--Former Agrarian Party --small-farm constituency --Strongly supports Finnish-Soviet trade --Opposes nuclear power --Supports traditional Finnish neutrality
*Liberals will run separate candidates		
Communist/Popular Democratic Front (SKDL)*	Esko Helle, Chairman	
Eurocommunist Majority (SKP)	Arvo Ranto, Chairman	--Supports traditional Finnish neutrality --Supports increased nationalization of industry --ostensibly tolerant of limited private enterprise --Wants smaller Finnish Army --Supports 35-hour workweek --Desires expanded social welfare programs
*SKDL is electoral front of Communists and Left Socialists		

Stalinist Minority (DEVA** or Democratic Alternative)	Kristiina Halkola, Chairman (figurehead) Taisto Sinisalo, head of minority faction; Advisory Committee to Executive Council	--Pro-Soviet --Wait and see on nuclear power; want to avoid discussing Chernobyl accident --would nationalize private industry
---	---	---

**DEVA is electoral front of
Stalinist Minority

Rural Party (SMP)	Pekka Vannamo, Chairman	--Historically, foreign policy not a major concern --Opposes nuclear weapons --Opposes nuclear power --Supports traditional Finnish neutrality --Focuses on domestic issues --City, small town constituency
-------------------	-------------------------	--

Swedish People's Party (RKP)	Christoffer Taxell, Minister of Justice, Chairman	--Originally party of Swedish- speaking Finns --Supports traditional Finnish neutrality --Focuses on domestic issues
---------------------------------	--	--

Christian League (SKL)	Esko Almgren	--Supports traditional Finnish neutrality --Focuses on domestic and morality issues --Opposes nuclear energy
------------------------	--------------	--

Greens*	No evident chairman Spokesmen: Ville Lomsi, MP Kalle Konkkola, MP Osma Soininvaara, Executive Committee Secretary	--Support traditional Finnish neutrality --Oppose SDI and nuclear energy --Focus on environmental and social welfare issues
---------	--	--

Rightest Constitutionalists (POP)	George Ehrnrooth, Chairman and Founder	--Pro-US --Pro-Israel --Anti-Soviet
--------------------------------------	---	---

Outcomes	Parties	Possible Seats	Likelihood	Implications
1. Current Center/ Left Coalition	Social Democrats Center Party Swedish People's Party Rural Party	123	Very Likely	--Closer Cooperation with Western Europe and US --Increased Privatization --Oppose SDI --Support Nordic Nuclear- Weapons-Free-Zone Dialogue
2. SDP/Center/ Conservative Coalition	Social Democrats Center Party Conservative Party	139	Somewhat Likely	--Could be "caretaker" until the presidential election --Closer Cooperation with Western Europe and US --Increased Privatization --Oppose SDI --Support Nordic Nuclear- Weapons-Free-Zone Dialogue
3. Minority Social Democratic Government	Social Democrats	57	Possible	--Closer Cooperation with Western Europe and US --Oppose SDI --Support Nordic Nuclear- Weapons-Free-Zone Dialogue
4. Broad Party Coalition	Social Democrats Center Party Conservative Party Swedish People's Party Rural Party Communist/Popular Democratic Front	177	Possible, not likely	--Closer Cooperation with Western Europe and US --Oppose SDI --Support Nordic Nuclear- Weapons-Free-Zone Dialogue

Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/02/09 : CIA-RDP90T00114R000302930001-1

Outcomes

5. Red/Black Coalition	Conservative Party Social Democrats	101	Possible, not likely	--Closer Cooperation with Western Europe and US --Increased Privatization --Oppose SDI --Support Nordic Nuclear-Weapons-Free-Zone Dialogue
6. Minority Conservative Government	Conservative Party	44	Possible, not likely	--Closer Cooperation with Western Europe and US --Increased Privatization --Oppose SDI --Less interest in support for Nordic-Nuclear-Weapons-Free-Zone Dialogue --Least Acceptable to USSR --Establishment of CPSU/Conservative Party formal relations
7. Popular Front	Social Democrats Center Party Communist/Popular Democratic Front	105	Not Likely	--Closer Cooperation with Western Europe and US --Oppose SDI --Support Nordic Nuclear-Weapons-Free-Zone Dialogue --Less Privatization --Strengthen Communist/Popular Democratic Front

25X1

SUBJECT: Finland: Election Politics and Personalities [REDACTED]

25X1

Distribution:

External:

- 1 - Steve Wallace, Pentagon JSI-4AMB-924
- 1 - [REDACTED] DIA RTS 2B
- 1 - Joe Halgus, Pentagon, OASD/ISP, Rm. 40762
- 1 - John Kachold, Pentagon, Rm. 40762
- 1 - F. Herbert Capps, INR/WEA/State/Rm. 4742
- 1 - Ford Cooper, EUR/NE/State/Rm. 4513
- 1 - Dick Christensen, EUR/NE/State/Rm. 4513
- 1 - Lee Ann Scheuer, Dept. of Commerce

25X1

Internal:

- 1 - [REDACTED] West Europe Branch, 212 Key
- 1 - DCI-DDCI Executive Staff [REDACTED]
- 1 - DDI
- 1 - NIC/AG
- 4 - CPAS/IMC/CB
- 1 - MPS/PES
- 1 - D/EURA
- 1 - DD/EURA
- 1 - C/EURA/WE
- 1 - DC/EURA/WE
- 2 - EURA Production Staff
- 1 - EURA/WE Production file
- 1 - EURA/WE/UK Production file

25X1

25X1

25X1